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Abstract	  The	   problem	   of	   mental	   causation	   in	   contemporary	   philosophy	   of	   mind	   concerns	   the	  possibility	   of	   holding	   two	   different	   views	   that	   are	   in	   apparent	   tension.	   The	   first	   is	  physicalism,	  the	  view	  that	  there	  is	  nothing	  more	  to	  the	  world	  than	  the	  physical.	  The	  second	  is	  that	  the	  mental	  has	  genuine	  causal	  efficacy	  in	  a	  way	  that	  does	  not	  reduce	  to	  pure	  physical	  particle-­‐bumping.	  This	  article	  provides	  a	  historical	  background	  to	  this	  question,	  with	  focus	  on	  Davidson’s	  anomalous	  monism	  and	  Kim’s	  causal	  exclusion	  problem.	  Responses	  to	  causal	  exclusion	  are	  categorized	  in	  terms	  of	  six	  different	  argumentative	  strategies.	   In	  conclusion,	  caution	  is	  advised	  regarding	  the	  inclination	  to	  reduce	  the	  mental	  to	  the	  physical	  and	  sketch	  a	  positive	  direction	   for	  substantively	  characterizing	  mental	  causation	  by	  recourse	  to	  well-­‐confirmed	  accounts	  of	  causation	  coupled	  with	  empirical	  research.	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Introduction	  	  Cognitive	  neuroscience	  is	  often	  take	  to	  either	  imply,	  or	  minimally	  to	  be	  compatible	  with,	  a	  view	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  mind	  called	  physicalism.	  Physicalism	  is	  the	  view	  that	  everything	  in	  the	   world,	   including	   but	   not	   limited	   to	   the	   mind,	   is	   purely	   physical	   in	   character;	   it	  essentially	  denies	  the	  existence	  of	  non-­‐physical	  entities	  or	  processes.	  The	  debate	  about	  the	  existence	  and	  nature	  of	  mental	  causation	  stems	  from	  a	  tension	  between	  a	  commitment	  to	  physicalism	   concerning	   the	   nature	   of	   the	  mind,	   and	   the	   apparent	   causal	   efficacy	   of	   such	  mental	   events	   or	   states	   such	   as	   having	   an	   intention	   or	   committing	   an	   action.	   The	  commitment	  to	  physicalism	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  ‘spooky’	  mental	  causes,	  such	  that	  thoughts,	  beliefs,	   or	   intentions	   are	   not	   themselves	   physical,	   but	   somehow	   reach	   out	   and	   poke	   the	  physical	  world.	  Physicalism	  is	  generally	  taken	  to	  imply	  that,	  whatever	  mindedness	  turns	  out	  to	   be,	   it	   should	   fit	   clearly	   into	   the	   nexus	   of	   physical	   causes	   with	   which	   we	   are	   already	  familiar.	   On	   one	   hand,	   this	   commitment	   appears	   very	  much	   in	   line	  with	   the	   approach	   to	  studying	   the	  mind	   in	   cognitive	   neuroscience.	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   realm	  of	   the	  mental	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appears	   at	   least	   prima	   facie	   to	   be	   genuinely	   causally	   efficacious	   –	  we	  do	   at	   least	   seem	   to	  bring	   about	   our	   actions	   by	   deliberation	   and	   intentions	   on	   which	   we	   act	   –	   in	   ways	   that	  cannot	  be	  straightforwardly	  reduced	  to	  familiar	  physical	  causation.	  This	  perceived	  conflict	  between	  physical	   causation	  and	   the	  place	  of	   the	  mental	   is	   the	   source	  of	  debate	  about	   the	  existence	  and	  nature	  of	  mental	  causation.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  mental	  is	  characteristically	  ordered	  by	  rational	  norms	  that	  do	  not	  appear	  to	   exist	   in	   physical	   causation	   pulls	   towards	   causal	   autonomy	   of	   the	   mental	   from	   the	  physical,	  while	  the	  commitment	  to	  physicalism	  resists	  this	  as	  spooky	  or	  mysterious.	  Solving	  the	  problem	  of	  mental	  causation	  requires	  finding	  a	  way	  to	  reconcile	  physicalism	  about	  the	  mind	  with	   causal	   efficacy	  of	   the	  mental,	   either	  by	   situating	  mental	   causes	   in	   the	  physical	  world,	  by	  rejecting	  mental	  causes,	  or	  by	  rejecting	  physicalism.	  This	  article	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  first	  two	  of	  these	  options,	  since	  the	  commitment	  to	  physicalism	  is	  both	  widespread	  in	  this	  discussion,	  and	  a	  unifying	  premise	  shared	  by	  many	  disparate	  views.	  	  	  The	  problem	  of	  mental	   causation	   is	   closely	   related	   to,	   but	   not	   the	   same	   as,	  what	   is	   often	  called	  the	  mind-­‐body	  problem.	  The	  mind-­‐body	  problem	  concerns	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  mind	   and	   the	   body:	   is	   the	  mind	   nothing	  more	   than	   the	   physical	   body	  with	   a	   certain	  arrangement	  of	  parts?	  Is	  the	  mind	  a	  collection	  of	  causal	  functions	  performed	  by	  the	  body?	  How	   does	   consciousness	   arise	   from	   the	   body?	   The	   problem	   of	   mental	   causation	   is	  intricately	  connected	  in	  that	  many	  answers	  to	  the	  question	  of	  how	  the	  mind	  and	  body	  are	  related	   will	   have	   starkly	   differing	   consequences	   for	   whether	   or	   not	   the	   mind	   has	   any	  genuine	   causal	   efficacy	   on	   the	   body,	   or	   on	   the	   world	   via	   the	   body.	   They	   are,	   however,	  different	  issues.	  The	  question	  of	  phenomenal	  consciousness	  and	  its	  relationship	  to	  various	  neurophysiological	   processes	   may	   be	   answered,	   for	   instance,	   without	   thereby	   yielding	   a	  firm	   answer	   to	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   phenomenal	   consciousness	   has	   genuine	   causal	  efficacy,	  on	  what	  it	  can	  act,	  etc.	  	  	  
Historical	  background	  
	  The	   original	   version	   of	   the	   problem	   of	   mental	   causation	   as	   it	   figures	   in	   contemporary	  debates	  is	  often	  taken	  to	  begin	  with	  Descartes’	  Meditations	  (1641/1996),	  although	  it	  can	  be	  dated	  back	  as	   far	  as	  Plato’s	  Phaedo.	  Descartes	  presented	  a	  dualist	  picture	  of	   the	  world	  as	  comprised	  of	  two	  distinct	  substances,	  physical	  and	  mental.	  Physical	  substances,	  or	  objects	  made	  of	  matter,	  are	  spatially	  extended	  and	  located,	  and	  are	  not	  capable	  of	  thought.	  Anything	  composed	   solely	   of	   matter	   moves	   via	   mechanical	   forces	   only;	   Descartes	   thought	   that	  animals,	  for	  instance,	  were	  simply	  very	  complicated	  automata.	  Mental	  substances,	  or	  minds	  or	  souls,	  are	  that	  which	  thinks;	  they	  are	  not	  spatially	  extended	  or	  located.	  Properties	  had	  by	  physical	   substances	   are,	   on	   Descartes’	   view,	   fundamentally	   incompatible	   with	   mental	  substances.	  Minds	  cannot	  have	  shapes	  or	  motion,	  and	  material	  objects	  cannot	  have	  thoughts	  or	  sensations.	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  Humans	  are,	  according	  to	  Descartes,	  an	  intimate	  union	  of	  a	  material	  body	  that	  moves	  like	  a	  machine	  with	  a	  mental	  substance	  that	  thinks,	  that	  senses	  via	  the	  material	  body,	  and	  that	  can	  influence	  the	  motion	  of	  that	  material	  body.	  Descartes	  was	  careful	  to	  avoid	  a	  view	  in	  which	  the	  mind	  and	  body	  were	  overly	  separate.	  The	  mind/body	  union	  is	  not	  like	  the	  ship	  in	  which	  a	  sailor	  directs	  the	  motion,	  he	  says.	  A	  sailor	  can	  only	  know	  that	  there	  is	  damage	  to	  the	  ship’s	  hull	  by	  going	  and	  inspecting	  it.	  But	  we	  can	  know	  things	  about	  our	  body	  in	  a	  direct	  way,	  by	  sensing,	  in	  a	  way	  that	  we	  cannot	  with	  any	  other	  material	  body	  to	  which	  our	  thinking	  minds	  are	   not	   intimately	   connected.	  We	   don’t	   control	   our	   body	   in	   the	   distant	  way	   in	  which	  we	  control	  a	  puppet;	  there	  is	  an	  immediacy	  to	  how	  we	  move	  our	  limbs	  that	  is	  the	  consequence	  of	   our	  minds	   being	   connected	   in	   this	   special	  way	   to	   our	   body	   and	   not	   to	   other	   pieces	   of	  matter.	  	  Descartes	  thus	  denies	  physicalism	  about	  the	  mind-­‐body	  relationship:	  the	  mind	  could	  not	  be	  made	   out	   of	   particular	   bits	   of	   matter;	   no	   amount	   or	   organization	   of	   matter	   could	   ever	  comprise	  a	  mind,	  because	  it	  would	  always	  be	  of	  the	  wrong	  kind	  of	  substance	  to	  do	  so.	  But	  the	  mind	  is	  intimately	  connected	  to	  some	  particular	  chunk	  of	  matter,	  to	  its	  body.	  It	  receives	  sensations	   from	   that	   body	   and,	   most	   relevant	   for	   our	   purposes,	   it	   also	  moves	   that	   body	  directly,	  but	  no	  other	  bodies	  directly.	  There	  are	  then	  two	  directions	  of	  influence	  that	  pose	  a	  problem:	  how	  does	  the	  physical	  world	  have	  a	  causal	  effect	  on	  the	  mind	  via	  perception?	  And,	  how	  does	  the	  mind	  influences	  the	  body?	  	  	  Descartes’	   account	   is	   illuminating	   of	   the	   trajectory	   of	   discourse	   on	  mental	   causation	   not	  only	  because	  he	  runs	   into	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  problem,	  but	  also	  because	  he	   then	  proposes	  a	  certain	   kind	   of	   solution	   that	   runs	   into	   another	   very	   characteristic	   problem.	   His	   dualist	  account	  generates	  a	  clear	  case	  of	  a	  problem	  for	  mental	  causation	  by	  conceiving	  of	  the	  mind	  as	   an	   entirely	   different	   kind	   of	   thing	   than	   the	   physical	   body	   on	  which	   it	   acts.	   If	   physical	  motion	   is	   entirely	   mechanical,	   and	   the	   mind	   is	   entirely	   unphysical,	   how	   does	   the	   mind	  communicate	  motion	  to	  the	  body?	  His	  solution	  is	  to	  propose	  a	  way-­‐station	  where	  physical	  bumpings	   and	   pullings	   are	   translated	   into	   signals	   that	   influence	   the	   mind.	   Sensation	  involves	   physical	   causation	   that	   is	   transmitted	   via	   a	   complicated	   series	   of	   physical	  machinery	   to	   a	   special	   place	   in	   the	   brain	   –	   famously,	   he	   proposed	   the	   pineal	   gland	   as	   a	  possible	  site	  for	  this	  –	  that	  translates	  the	  physical	  signal	  into	  a	  mental	  one.	  Once	  the	  mind	  resolves	  to	  do	  something,	  such	  as	  lift	  an	  arm,	  that	  mental	  signal	  is	  then	  translated	  back	  via	  the	  same	  site	  to	  a	  physical	  signal	  that	  would	  pull	  and	  push	  on	  the	  right	  parts	  of	  the	  body	  to	  make	  the	  arm	  go	  up.	  	  This	  solution	  to	  how	  the	  mind	  and	  body	  causally	  influence	  one	  another	  doesn’t	  really	  solve	  the	  problem,	  though.	  Instead,	  it	  relocates	  it.	  Proposing	  a	  way-­‐station	  that	  translates	  mental	  and	   physical	   influence	   back	   and	   forth	   between	   the	   two	   kinds	   of	   substance	   physically	  isolates	   the	   location	   whereby	   the	   mind	   controls	   the	   body,	   but	   still	   does	   not	   answer	   the	  problem	  of	  how,	   exactly,	   the	  pineal	   gland	   translates	  between	   two	   fundamentally	  different	  substances.	  Localizing	  the	  physical	  space	  in	  which	  such	  a	  translation	  happens	  is	  arguably	  an	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improvement	  over	  allowing	   it	   to	  happen	  all	  over	   the	  body,	  but	   still	   it	  does	  not	  budge	   the	  problem	  of	  mental	  causation:	  how	  does	  that	  mental	  influence	  get	  to	  the	  body,	  and	  use	  that	  body	   to	   influence	   the	   world?	   This	   has	   been	   called	   by	   Robb	   and	   Heil	   (2013)	   a	   problem	  concerning	   the	  causal	  nexus	  by	  which	  mind	  and	  body	  are	  connected:	   “Any	  causal	  relation	  requires	  a	  nexus,	  some	  interface	  by	  means	  of	  which	  cause	  and	  effect	  are	  connected.”	  	  	  The	  way	  in	  which	  this	  problem	  arises	  in	  Descartes’	  account	  is	  particular	  to	  his	  dualist	  views,	  and	   the	  problem	  of	  how	   the	  mind	   could	  exercise	  a	   causal	   influence	   in	   the	  physical	  world	  looks	   somewhat	   different	   when	   one	   rejects	   substance	   dualism.	   But	   it	   is	   a	   problem	   for	  causation	  that	  will	  arise	  in	  a	  different	  form	  anytime	  the	  mental	  and	  physical	  are	  treated	  as	  of	  different	  sorts:	  how,	  not	  merely	  where,	  does	  one	  causally	  influence	  the	  other?	  	  This	   problem	   of	   how	   the	   mental	   could	   influence	   the	   physical	   simply	   does	   not	   arise	   in	  accounts	   of	   the	   mind	   that	   treat	   it	   as	   identical	   with,	   or	   at	   least	   of	   the	   same	   kind	   of	  metaphysical	  substance	  as,	  the	  brain	  –	  in	  other	  words,	  in	  any	  physicalist	  account	  of	  mind.	  In	  the	   20th	   century,	   for	   instance,	   the	   identity	   theory	   held	   that	   the	   mind	   just	   is	   the	   brain	   –	  processes	  in	  the	  mind	  are	  not	  merely	  correlated	  with,	  but	  simply	  are	  identical	  to,	  processes	  in	  the	  brain	  (for	   instance,	  Smart	  1959).	   In	  this	  account,	   there	   is	  no	  causal	   influence	  of	   the	  mental	  beyond	  that	  of	  the	  causal	  influence	  exerted	  by	  the	  brain.	  Type	  identity	  theory	  is	  the	  views	  that	  types	  of	  mental	  processes,	  like	  pain,	  simply	  are	  types	  of	  physical	  processes,	  like	  C-­‐fibers	   firing.	   The	   view	   that	   types	   of	  mental	   processes	   or	   events	   are	   nothing	   other	   than	  types	   of	   physical	   events	   or	   processes	   is	   also	   called	   reductive	   physicalism:	   physicalism,	  because	  it	  holds	  that	  the	  mind	  is	  physical	  in	  character,	  and	  reductive,	  because	  it	  holds	  that	  the	  mental	  reduces	  to	  the	  physical.	  	  While	   there	   are	   different	   versions	   of	   it,	   reductive	   physicalism,	   in	   any	   form,	   solves	   the	  tension	  between	  a	  physicalist	  view	  of	  mind	  and	  the	  apparent	  causal	  efficacy	  of	  the	  mental	  by	   denying	   that	   mental	   causal	   efficacy	   is	   anything	   other	   than	   the	   causal	   efficacy	   of	  neurophysiological	   processes.	   The	   reductive	   element	   of	   the	   view	   means	   that	   mental	  causation	   is	   a	   placeholder	   for	   the	   real	   causal	   story	   which	   inevitably	   involves	   brain	  processes,	   microphysical	   particle	   states,	   or	   some	   other	   straightforwardly	   physical	   cause.	  Reductive	  physicalism	  about	  the	  mind	  follows	  a	  trend	  in	  the	  20th	  century	  that	  characterizes	  many	  scientifically-­‐informed	  philosophical	  accounts.	   It	  organizes	  the	  relationship	  between	  types	   like	   the	  mental	   and	   physical	   in	   terms	   of	   levels,	   such	   that	   the	   causal	   efficacy	   (and,	  indeed,	   other	   features	   like	  metaphysical	   fundamentality)	   of	   higher	   levels	   depend	   on	   and	  reduce	  to	  that	  of	  lower	  levels.	  The	  mental	  is	  causally	  efficacious	  only	  insofar	  as	  it	  reduces	  to	  the	   physical,	   and	   the	   physical	   is	   causally	   efficacious.	   Reductive	   physicalists	   allow	   that	  mental	  terms	  are	  a	  pragmatic	  convenience	  and	  don’t	  need	  to	  be	  eliminated,	  so	  long	  as	  they	  are	  understood	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  short-­‐hand	  for	  the	  ‘real’	  causal	  story.	  This	  means	  that	  reductive	  physicalism	  is	  less	  strong	  than	  eliminative	  physicalism,	  which	  holds	  that	  mental	  terms	  will,	  or	  at	  least	  should,	  be	  replaced	  entirely	  (P.S.	  Churchland	  1986;	  P.M.	  Churchland	  1981).	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Anomalous	  monism	  and	  causal	  exclusion	  	  The	   tension	   between	   physicalism	   and	   the	   causal	   efficacy	   of	   the	   mental	   was	   given	   an	  influential	   analysis	   by	   Donald	   Davidson	   (1980/2001;	   also,	   1995).	   He	   aimed	   to	   both	  preserve	  physicalism	  as	  a	  view	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  mind	  as	  part	  of	  the	  physical	  world	  studied	  by	  science,	  while	  also	  arguing	  for	  autonomy	  from	  physical	  causation	  for	  causes	  and	  causal	  relations	  that	  involve	  mental	  terms.	  The	  mental	  was	  part	  of	  the	  physical	  world,	  but	  could	  not	  be	  reduced	  to	   the	   laws	  of	  physics.	  His	  view,	  anomalous	  monism,	  was	  pitched	  at	  least	  partially	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  reductive	  physicalism.	  His	  account	  offers	  a	  nonreductive	  physicalist	  way	   to	   accommodate	  both	  of	   the	   intuitions	   that	   there	   is	   nothing	  non-­‐material	  about	  mental	  events	  and	  that	  mental	  events	  do	  have	  genuine	  causal	  efficacy.	  	  	  	  This	   section	  explores	  Davidson’s	   account	   and	  Kim’s	   challenge	   to	   it,	   and	  how	   this	   sets	   the	  framework	   for	   much	   of	   the	   contemporary	   debate	   about	   mental	   causation,	   as	   well	   as	  connecting	  that	  debate	  to	  the	  broader	  issue	  of	  higher	  versus	  lower	  level	  causation	  generally.	  	  Davidson	  subscribes	  to	  what	  he	  calls	  the	  Cause	  Law	  thesis	  (1995),	  which	  is	  one	  of	  the	  key	  premises	   in	   his	   account	   and	   closely	   related	   to	   the	   deductive-­‐nomological	   model	   of	  explanation	   in	   science.	   According	   to	   the	   Cause	   Law	   thesis,	   all	   true	   causal	   statements	   are	  such	   that	   some	   general	   causal	   law	   connects	   the	   cause	   and	   the	   effect	   under	   some	  description.	   Singular	   causal	   claims	   are	  made	   true	   because	   there	   is	   an	   underlying	   general	  law	  of	  the	  form,	  All	  Xs	  cause	  Ys,	  such	  that	  the	  cause	  and	  the	  effect	  are	  instances	  of	  Xs	  and	  Ys.	  The	   singular	   claim,	   “that	   rock	   just	   broke	   this	  window,”	  might	   be	   true	   because	   “All	   rocks,	  thrown	   sufficiently	   hard,	   break	  windows,”	   is	   true.	   This	   is	  where	   the	   nomological	   force	   of	  causal	   relationships	   comes	   from	   –	   the	   cause	   necessitates	   the	   effect	   because	   of	   the	   law	  connecting	  them,	  and	  without	  such	  a	  law,	  there	  would	  be	  no	  connection	  between	  cause	  and	  effect.	  	  According	  to	  Davidson,	  causes	  and	  effects	  are	  those	  things	  out	  there	  in	  the	  world,	  to	  which	  we	  point	  with	  our	  descriptions.	  As	   such,	  Davidson	  holds	   that	   the	  same	  causes	  and	  effects	  can	   be	   picked	   out	   using	   different	   descriptions.	  When	  we	  make	   a	   true	   causal	   claim	   that	   x	  caused	   y,	   it	   is	   true	   because	   of	   that	   covering	   law,	   regardless	   of	  whether	   the	   covering	   law	  involves	  x	  and	  y	  so	  described	  or	  if	  it	  involves	  x	  and	  y	  under	  an	  entirely	  different	  description.	  Thus,	   the	   Cause	   Law	   thesis	   is	   an	   existence	   claim	   about	   there	   being	   a	   law	   under	   some	  description	  of	   the	   cause	   and	  effect,	   not	   that	   there	   is	   a	   law	   for	   every	  description,	   nor	   that	  there	   is	   a	   law	   that	  we	   know,	   or	   even	   that	  we	   know	   the	  description	  under	  which	   the	   law	  holds.	  It	  is	  merely	  the	  claim	  that,	  whether	  or	  not	  we	  ever	  know	  it,	  there	  is	  such	  a	  description	  and	  such	  a	  law,	  and	  it	  is	  this	  which	  makes	  true	  any	  causal	  claim,	  including	  but	  not	  limited	  to	  those	  involving	  mental	  causes.	  	  Putting	   these	   pieces	   together,	   Davidson	   holds	   that	   mental	   causes	   (and	   effects,	   although	  mental	  causation	  is	  primarily	  taken	  to	  be	  problematic	  for	  mental	  causes	  of	  physical	  events)	  are,	  extensionally,	  part	  of	  the	  same	  physical	  causal	  nexus	  that	  is	  studied	  by	  the	  sciences,	  and	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are	   thus	   causal	   because	   they	   figure	   in	   true	   general	   laws.	   However,	   there	   are	   no	   laws	  containing	  mental	   terms	   –	   no	   laws	   in	  which	   both	   X	   and	  Y	   are	  mental,	   nor	   laws	   in	  which	  either	   X	   or	   Y	   are	  mental.	   Mental	   causes	   can	   be	   genuinely	   causal,	   but	  mental	   causes	   and	  effects	  are	  anomalous	  because	  it	  is	  never	  as	  mental	  that	  they	  are	  covered	  by	  a	  law.	  Mental	  descriptions	  are	  one	  way	  of	  describing	  the	  causes	  and	  effects	  in	  questions,	  but	  not	  the	  only	  way.	  If	  one	  were	  to	  redescribe	  those	  same	  causes	  and	  effects	  in	  other	  terms,	  namely,	  in	  the	  right	  physical	  terms,	  then	  a	  general	  law	  of	  the	  form	  All	  Xs	  are	  Ys	  would	  cover	  every	  instance	  of	  true	  mental	  causation.	  But	  it	  would	  never	  cover	  it	  under	  the	  mental	  description.	  	  	  In	   this	  way,	  Davidson	  hopes	   to	  salvage	   features	  of	   the	  mental,	   like	  rational	  constraints	  on	  action,	  while	  still	  situating	  mental	  causation	  within	  the	  same	  causal	  nexus	  as	  the	  causes	  and	  effects	  studies	   in	  the	  sciences.	  The	  kinds	  of	  causal	  relationships	  we	  find	   in	  physics	  cannot	  account	  for	  or	  accommodate	  what	  he	  called	  “the	  uneliminably	  normative	  or	  rational	  aspect	  of	   intentional	   idioms,	   and	   the	   consequent	   irreducibility	   of	   mental	   concepts	   to	   concepts	  amenable	  to	  inclusion	  in	  a	  closed	  system	  of	  laws”	  (Davidson,	  1995).	  Because	  the	  mental	  is	  anomalous,	   with	   no	   genuine	   laws	   involving	   mental	   terms,	   it	   cannot	   be	   reduced	   to	   the	  merely	   physical.	   Mental	   descriptions	   continue	   to	   be	   useful	   as	   a	   separate	   domain	   of	  discourse,	  even	  while	  acknowledging	  that	  the	  mental	  cause	  and	  effects	  in	  question	  are	  not	  anything	   above	   and	   beyond	   the	   physical	   causal	   nexus	   with	   which	   we	   are	   scientifically	  comfortable.	  The	  mental	   is	  simply	  another	  way,	  a	  nonreducible	  way,	  of	  describing	  certain	  parts	  of	  that	  nexus.	  	  There	  are	  many	   issues	   that	  could	  be	  raised	  (and	  have	  been,	  by	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  authors)	  with	   respect	   to	   Davidson’s	   account.	   For	   instance,	   it	   relies	   on	   the	   rather	   antiquated	  deductive-­‐nomological	  account	  of	  explanation,	  where	  causal	  explanations	  must	  all	  be	  made	  true	  by	  universal	  laws.	  Given	  other	  accounts	  of	  explanation	  and/or	  causation,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  anomalous	  monism	  could	  even	  be	  formulated,	  or	  that	  mental	  causation	  actually	  poses	  any	   kind	   of	   particular	   problem	   –	  we’ll	   explore	   this	   line	   of	   thought	  more	   in	   a	   subsequent	  section.	   Furthermore,	   it	   is	   something	   of	   a	   matter	   of	   faith	   that	   there	   really	   are	   multiple	  legitimate	  descriptions	  of	   the	  same	  mental	  causal	  relata.	  As	  we’ll	  also	  see	   in	  a	  subsequent	  section,	  there	  are	  many	  cases	  where	  redescribing	  causal	  relata	  actually	  changes	  the	  subject,	  by	  changing	  the	  causal	  relationships	  into	  which	  it	  enters.	  But	  for	  now,	  it	  suffices	  to	  lay	  out	  Davidson’s	  view	  of	  anomalous	  monism	  as	  a	  key	  position	  that	  aimed	  to	  accommodate	  mental	  causation	  within	  the	  commitments	  of	  physicalism,	  against	  which	  the	  main	  challenge	  against	  genuine	  mental	  causation,	  that	  of	  causal	  exclusion,	  is	  targeted.	  	  Davidson’s	  account	   is	  the	  primary	  target	   for	   Jaegwon	  Kim’s	  (1989,	  2000)	  causal	  exclusion	  argument,	   which	   is	   arguably	   the	   core	   of	   the	   contemporary	   problem	   of	  mental	   causation.	  Kim	  challenges	  the	  idea	  that	  Davidson	  has	  salvaged	  genuine	  causal	  efficacy	  for	  the	  mental,	  and	   argues	   that	   it	   is	   instead	   a	  different	   form	  of	   reductive	  physicalism.	  Kim’s	   challenge	   to	  anomalous	  monism	  can	  be	  generalized	  to	  pose	  an	  issue	  not	  just	  for	  mental	  causes,	  but	  for	  any	  causes	  that	  are	  in	  some	  way	  higher-­‐level	  with	  respect	  to	  another	  set	  of	  potential	  causal	  relata.	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  Kim’s	  influential	  work	  involves	  both	  a	  specific	  criticism	  of	  Davidson’s	  account	  as	  well	  as	  a	  broader	  challenge	  to	  any	  nonreductive	  account	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  mental	  and	  the	  physical.	  One	  of	  his	  main	  criticisms	  of	  Davidson’s	  account	  of	  anomalous	  monism	  is	  that	  it	   does	   not	   actually	   establish	   genuine	   causal	   efficacy	   for	   the	   mental,	   and,	   thus,	   does	   not	  block	  the	  reduction	  of	  the	  mental	  to	  the	  physical.	  That	  some	  event	  has	  a	  mental	  description	  is	   causally	   irrelevant,	   claims	  Kim	  (1989).	   If	   it	   is	  only	  under	  a	  physical	  description	   that	  an	  event	   can	   be	   covered	   by	   a	   law,	   and	   it	   is	   only	   because	   of	   a	   covering	   law	   that	   an	   event	   is	  causally	  efficacious,	   then	  no	  mental	  event	   is	  ever	  causally	  efficacious	  because	   it	   is	  mental,	  but	  only	  because	  it	  is	  physical.	  	  	  Horgan	   referred	   to	   this	   as	   the	   problem	   of	   quausation	   (1989):	   mental	   events	   enter	   into	  causal	  relationships,	  but	  only	  as	  physical	  events,	  never	  by	  dint	  of	  their	  being	  mental	  events.	  The	  mental	  is	  an	  epiphenomenal	  ride-­‐along	  of	  the	  physical,	  meaning	  that	  mental	  causation	  is	  merely	  apparent	  and	  nothing	  other	  than	  microphysical	  causation	  under	  a	  different	  name.	  Many	   authors	   find	   this	   an	   acceptable	   conclusion.	   But,	   in	   order	   to	   retain	   physicalism	  and	  genuine	   causal	   efficacy	   of	   the	  mental,	   something	  more	   is	   needed	   than	   simply	   having	   any	  kind	  of	  causal	  efficacy.	  It	  needs	  to	  be	  the	  right	  sort	  of	  causal	  efficacy,	  the	  sort	  attributable	  to	  mentality,	  not	  merely	  physicality.	  	  The	   broader	   challenge	   that	   Kim	   has	   issued	   is	   often	   referred	   to	   as	   the	   causal	   exclusion	  problem.	  It	  applies	  to	  any	  nonreductive	  yet	  physicalist	  account	  of	  the	  mental,	  and	  sets	  out	  what	  must	  be	  overcome	  in	  order	  for	  mental	  causation	  to	  be	  genuinely	  mental,	  rather	  than	  an	   epiphenomenal	   redescription	   of	   genuine	   microphysical	   causation.	   Kim	   highlights	   the	  tension	   between	  physicalism	   and	   genuine	  mental	   causal	   efficacy	   by	   pointing	   out	   that	   the	  class	   of	   physical	   causes	   is	   supposed	   to	   be	   complete:	   for	   any	   physical	   effect,	   there	   is	   a	  sufficient	   cause	   of	   it	   that	   is	   physical,	   also.	   This	   is	   the	   rejection	   of	   dualism,	   of	   ‘spooky’	  nonphysical	  causation	  somehow	  bumping	  parts	  of	  the	  physical	  world	  around.	  According	  to	  anomalous	  monism,	   some	  physical	   causes	  are	  also	  mental	   causes.	  However,	   the	  effects	  of	  those	   causes	   are	   already	   ‘caused’,	   as	   it	   were:	   for	   any	   physical	   effect,	   there	   is	   already	   a	  complete	  physical	  causal	  story.	  	  	  One	  is	  then	  confronted	  with	  the	  following	  dilemma:	  either	  such	  effects,	  with	  both	  physical	  and	   mental	   causes,	   are	   overdetermined	   or	   they	   are	   not	   overdetermined.	   If	   they	   are	   not	  overdetermined,	  then	  there	  is	  something	  that	  the	  mental	  contributes	  causally	  to	  the	  effect.	  But	   this	   also	   violates	   the	   assumption	   of	   physicalism.	   On	   the	   other	   horn	   of	   the	   dilemma,	  however,	   all	   effects	  with	  mental	   causes	   are	   overdetermined,	  which	  means	   that	   they	  have	  multiple	   causes	   each	   of	  which	   is	   sufficient	   to	   bring	   about	   the	   effect.	   The	   physical	   causes	  alone,	  with	  no	  additional	  mental	  cause,	  would	  have	  been	  sufficient	  to	  bring	  about	  the	  effect	  exactly	   as	   it	   occurred.	   This	   horn	   has	   two	   unfortunate	   consequences.	   It	   renders	   mental	  causes	  systematically	  superfluous,	  while	  also	  committing	  to	  a	  metaphysically	  suspect	  view	  about	   the	   incredibly	   rampant	   presence	   of	   overdetermination	   in	   the	   world	   for	   just	   a	  particular	  set	  of	  causes,	  namely,	  all	  and	  only	  the	  mental	  ones.	  Neither	  horn	  of	  this	  dilemma	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accomplishes	   the	   goal	   of	   preserving	   both	   physicalism	   and	   genuine	   causal	   efficacy	   of	   the	  mental.	  	  The	  argument	   for	  causal	  exclusion	   is	  often	  accompanied	  by	   the	   following	  sort	  of	  diagram.	  M1	   and	   M2	   are	   singular	   tokens	   of	   particular	   mental	   events,	   and	   P1	   and	   P2	   are	   the	  corresponding	  physical	  event	  tokens	  on	  which	  the	  mental	  events	  depend.	  	   M1	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐>	  M2	  	  |	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  |	  	  |	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  |	  	  |	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  |	  	  |	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  |	  P1	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐>	  P2	  	  The	   vertical	   lines	   are	   of	   some	   kind	   of	   supervenience	   or	   ontological	   grounding	   relation	  between	  tokens	  of	  mental	  events	  and	  tokens	  of	  physical	  events.	  According	  to	  physicalism,	  all	  tokens	  of	  the	  mental	  must	  also	  be	  physical	  tokens.	  The	  horizontal	  line	  connecting	  P1	  and	  P2	   is	   causal:	   this	   represents	   the	   complete	   physical	   cause	   of	   P2.	   The	   question	   of	   mental	  causation	   is	   then	   the	   question	   of	   the	   causal	   efficacy	   of	   M1.	   There	   is	   an	   apparent	   causal	  relationship	  between	  M1	  and	  M2.	  But,	  M1	  supervenes	  on	  P1,	  and	  M2	  supervenes	  on	  P2.	  P1	  is	   a	   cause	  of	  P2,	  which	  means	   that	   there	   is	   already	  a	   complete	   cause	   for	  M2	   in	  P1.	  Kim’s	  claim	   is	   that	  M1	   reduces	   to	   P1	   as	   a	   cause:	   there	   is	   nothing	   about	  M2	   that	   is	   leftover	   or	  uncaused,	  such	  that	  M1	  can	  add	  by	  causally	  contributing	  to	  it.	  M1	  does	  not	  cause	  P2,	  since	  the	  completeness	  of	  the	  physical	  means	  that	  P2	  already	  has	  a	  sufficient	  physical	  cause,	  P1.	  What	  is	  left	  for	  M1	  to	  do,	  asks	  Kim?	  M1	  simply	  reduces	  to	  P1	  in	  this	  picture,	  which	  means	  that	  the	  project	  of	  salvaging	  both	  physicalism	  and	  autonomous	  mental	  efficacy	  has	  failed.	  	  The	   causal	   exclusion	  problem	  can	  be	  generalized	   to	  any	   set	  of	   token	   relata	   such	   that	  one	  kind	  of	  relata	  is	  identical	  with,	  supervenes	  on,	  is	  instantiated	  by,	  or	  is	  otherwise	  dependent	  on	  another	  kind	  of	  relata	  (see,	   for	   instance,	  Shapiro	  and	  Sober	  2007).	   In	  other	  words,	  any	  so-­‐called	   higher-­‐level	   phenomena	  will	   be	   subject	   to	   similar	   concerns	   about	   their	   genuine	  causal	   efficacy	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   their	   lower-­‐level	   counterparts.	   Evolutionary	   fitness,	   for	   instance,	  would,	  according	  to	  the	  generalized	  exclusion	  problem,	  have	  no	  causal	  efficacy	  of	   its	  own,	  being	  merely	  a	  stand-­‐in	  for	  the	  causal	  efficacy	  of	  its	  lower-­‐level	  instantiations	  in	  individual	  instances	   of	   reproductive	   success.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   evolution,	   this	   may	   seem	   like	   the	  appropriate	   stance	   to	   take	   about	   the	   potential	   causal	   efficacy	   of	   higher-­‐level	   causes:	   we	  should	  refrain	   from	  reifying	  them	  all	  as	  having	  some	  additional	  mysterious	  kind	  of	  causal	  efficacy	  all	  their	  own.	  But	  in	  other	  cases,	  such	  as	  causal	  efficacy	  attributed	  to	  organisms	  as	  reproductive	   units,	   rather	   than,	   for	   instances,	   their	   genes,	   this	   is	   not	   as	   clearly	   the	   right	  result.	  	  	  The	  generalized	  causal	  exclusion	  problem	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  criticism	  for	  the	  way	  in	  which	  it	  flattens	  causation,	  with	   the	  possibility	  of	  eliminating	   it	  altogether	   (see	  Block	  2003).	   If	   the	  
	   9	  
causal	  efficacy	  of	  higher	  level	  causes	  depends	  on	  or	  reduces	  to	  that	  of	  the	  lower	  level	  causes,	  then	  we	   can	  proceed	   to	   ask	   about	   the	   status	   of	   those	   lower	   level	   causes.	  Unless	   they	   are	  metaphysically	  bedrock,	  then	  they	  are	  in	  turn	  higher	  level	  than	  some	  other,	  yet-­‐lower	  level	  causes.	   In	   this	   fashion,	  we	  proceed	  down	   to	   the	  microphysical,	  where	  we	   confront	   a	  new	  kind	  of	  dilemma.	  On	  one	  hand,	  we	  could	  commit	  to	  there	  being	  some	  lowest	  level	  such	  that	  only	  events	  at	  this	  level	  are	  genuinely	  causal.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  there	  is	  no	  such	  lowest	  level,	   then	   causation	   “drains	   away”	   (Block	   2003)	   into	   the	   bottomless	   abyss	   of	   the	  microphysical,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  genuine	  causal	  efficacy	  to	  be	  found	  anywhere.	  	  	  The	  debate	  about	  causal	  drainage	   is	  somewhat	  off-­‐topic	   for	   the	   issue	  of	  mental	  causation,	  but	   it	   helps	   keep	   a	   perspective	   on	   the	   urge	   to	   reduce	   higher	   level	   to	   lower	   level	   causes.	  While	  this	  may	  seem	  like	  a	  clearly	  justified	  maneuver	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  single	  pair	  of	  causal	  types	   (such	   as	   mental	   to	   physical,	   or	   psychological	   to	   neurophysiological),	   it	   requires	  making	  an	  assumption	  about	  what	  kinds	  of	  causes	   lack	  genuine	  efficacy,	  namely,	  any	   that	  are	  higher	  level	  with	  respect	  to	  other	  causes.	  This	  assumption	  may	  undercut	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  reduction	  by	  rendering	  those	  lower	  level	  causes	  just	  as	  inefficacious	  as	  the	  higher	  level	  ones.	  If	  neither	  the	  higher	  nor	  the	  lower	  have	  real	  causal	  efficacy,	  the	  impetus	  to	  reduce	  one	  to	  the	  other	  is	  greatly	  diminished.	  	  There	  is	  some	  traction	  to	  be	  gained	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  causal	  exclusion	  and	  mental	  causation	  by	  considering	  the	  same	  structural	  problem	  for	  causal	  efficacy	  with	  different	  types	  of	  causes.	  Philosophers	   and	   scientists	   tend	   to	   have	   deeply	   entrenched	   views	   about	  what	   the	   ‘right’	  answer	   should	   be	   about	   mental	   causation,	   and	   this	   makes	   it	   easy	   to	   construct	   ad	   hoc	  ‘solutions’	   that	   have	   little	   merit	   other	   than	   yielding	   the	   correct	   conclusion,	   or	   to	   reject	  potentially	  viable	  accounts	  because	  they	  get	  the	  wrong	  conclusion.	  By	  considering	  the	  same	  question	   applied	   to	   different	   relata,	   such	   as	   evolutionary	   fitness	   or	   thermodynamic	  temperature,	  we	  can	  assess	  different	  proposals	  reconciling	  or	  rejecting	  higher-­‐level	  causal	  efficacy	  on	  more	  neutral	  territory,	  and	  only	  then	  apply	  the	  solution	  to	  mental	  causation	  in	  particular.	  	  The	   causal	   exclusion	   problem,	   applied	   to	   specifically	  mental	   causal	   relata,	   is	   the	   primary	  and	  dominant	  contemporary	  problem	  for	  mental	  causation.	  What	   is	  causing	  what,	  exactly,	  when	  we	  identify	  apparently	  mental	  causes,	  or	  offer	  causal	  explanations	  that	  rely	  on	  causal	  relationships	  involving	  mental	  relata?	  	  	  	  
Salvaging	  mental	  causation	  by	  solving	  or	  dissolving	  the	  exclusion	  problem	  	  More	  solutions	  for	  solving	  the	  causal	  exclusion	  problem	  have	  been	  proposed	  in	  the	  last	  two	  decades	   than	   are	   possible	   to	   canvas	   in	   one	   place.	   The	   responses	   to	   this	   contemporary	  version	   of	   the	   problem	   of	   mental	   causation	   can	   be	   helpfully	   categorized	   in	   terms	   of	   the	  strategies	   they	   employ,	   however.	   Considering	   responses	   in	   terms	   of	   these	   strategies	   is	   a	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useful	   way	   to	   map	   out	   the	   territory	   of	   ideas	   involved	   in	   the	   tangle	   of	   mental	   causation,	  mind-­‐body	  relationship,	  reduction,	  explanation,	  and	  more.	  	  Two	  popular	  general	  strategies	  are	  that	  of	  (i)	  changing	  the	  metaphysical	  type	  of	  the	  physical	  and	  mental	  tokens	  that	  are	  the	  relata	  in	  the	  above	  diagram,	  or	  (ii)	  changing	  the	  relationship	  posited	   between	   those	   tokens,	   such	   that	   the	   causal	   exclusion	   problem	   can	   no	   longer	   be	  formulated.	   Additional	   strategies	   involve	   various	   ways	   to	   bite	   the	   bullet,	   accepting	   that	  there	  is	  limited	  or	  no	  causal	  efficacy	  to	  the	  mental,	  and	  either	  (iii)	  rejecting	  the	  intuition	  that	  the	  mental	  should	  be	  treated	  as	  having	  causal	  efficacy,	  or	  (iv)	  offering	  a	  watered-­‐down	  form	  of	  relevance	  for	  the	  mental	  that	   falls	  short	  of	  genuine	  causal	  efficacy	  but	  offers	  something	  more	  than	  pure	  epiphenomenalism.	  Two	  additional	  strategies	  dissolve	  the	  problem,	  rather	  than	  solving	  it	  directly:	  (v)	  denying	  the	  identity	  of	  mental	  and	  physical	  tokens,	  which	  means	  denying	  the	  relationship	  represented	  vertically	   in	  the	  above	  diagram;	  and	  (vi)	  challenging	  the	  implicit	  assumptions	  about	  causation	  on	  which	  the	  causal	  exclusion	  problem	  relies,	  with	  recourse	   to	   specific	   theories	   of	   causation.	   I’ll	   briefly	   discuss	   each	   of	   these	   strategies	   in	  order.	  	  Strategy	   (i)	   starts	   by	   noting	   that	   the	   relata	   of	   mental	   and	   physical	   tokens	   used	   in	  formulating	   the	   causal	   exclusion	   problem	   could	   be	   of	   numerous	   different	   metaphysical	  types.	  A	  common	  approach	  is	  to	  follow	  Davidson	  and	  treat	  them	  as	  singular	  events,	  which	  is	  also	  convenient	  since	  events	  are	  a	  very	  common	  relata	  type	  in	  theories	  of	  causation.	  Token	  mental	   events	   just	   are	   specific,	   very	   complicated,	   physical	   tokens,	   and	   the	   mental	   event	  tokens	  stand	  in	  all	  and	  only	  the	  causal	  relations	   in	  which	  the	  physical	  event	  tokens	  stand.	  Token-­‐identity	  of	  events,	  however,	  leads	  straight	  to	  the	  causal	  exclusion	  problem	  whereby	  mental	  events	  do	  not	  have	  genuine	  causal	  efficacy.	  There	  are	  multiple	  potential	  candidates	  for	   the	  metaphysics	  of	   these	   tokens,	  but	  what	  unites	   these	  different	   accounts	   is	   that	   they	  each	   reconfigure	   the	   relata	   in	   the	   diagram	   above,	   as	   a	   way	   of	   attempting	   to	   block	   the	  reduction	  of	  the	  mental	  to	  the	  physical.	  	  Instead	   of	   treating	   the	  mental	   and	   physical	   relata	   as	   events,	   one	   could	   construe	   them	   in	  terms	  of	  properties.	  Perhaps	  the	  mental	  is	  a	  second	  order	  property,	  i.e.,	  a	  property	  had	  by	  some	   other,	   first	   order,	   property.	   If	   the	  mental	   is	   a	   second	   order	   property	   of	   first	   order	  physical	   properties,	   then	   it	   does	   not	   reduce	   away	   –	   it	   could	   be	   causally	   relevant	   or	  efficacious	  as	  a	  property	  of	  properties.	  There	  is	  thus	  only	  one	  token,	  having	  both	  physical,	  lower	   level,	   properties	   and	   mental,	   higher	   order,	   properties.	   Each	   instance	   of	   a	   mental	  property	  and	  a	  physical	  property	  are	   tokened	  by	   the	  same	  object.	  The	  mental	  property	   is	  multiply	  realizable,	  capable	  of	  being	  instantiated	  by	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  quite	  distinct	  physical	  tokens.	   As	   such,	   the	   mental	   properties	   do	   not	   reduce	   to	   the	   physical	   ones	   (see,	   on	   this,	  Bennett	  2003,	  Levin	  2009).	  	  Strategy	   (ii)	   is	   similar	   to	   (i)	   in	   attempting	   to	   block	   causal	   exclusion	   by	   changing	   the	  characterization	  of	  the	  diagram	  above,	  but	  instead	  of	  focusing	  on	  the	  relata,	  the	  focus	  is	  on	  the	   relationships	   between	   them.	   The	   horizontal	   lines	   are	   causal;	   but	   what	   precisely	   is	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represented	  by	  the	  vertical	  lines?	  How	  one	  cashes	  out	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  mental	  and	   the	   physical	   will	   affect	   the	   reducibility	   of	   mental	   causation	   to	   physical	   causation.	   A	  common	  approach	  is	  that	  of	  some	  kind	  of	  supervenience	  of	  the	  mental	  on	  the	  physical	  (see	  especially	  Wilson	  2005).	  	  	  Supervenience	   can	  be	   a	   very	  broad	  asymmetric	   relationship,	   committed	   to	   the	   claim	   that	  there	   can	   be	   no	   change	   in	   the	  mental	  without	   there	   also	   being	   a	   change	   in	   the	   physical,	  while	  there	  could	  potentially	  be	  a	  change	  in	  the	  physical	  without	  a	  change	  in	  the	  mental.	  For	  global	  supervenience,	  the	  mental	  parts	  of	  the	  world	  (be	  they	  events,	  properties,	  tropes,	  etc.	  –	  see	  strategy	  (i))	  supervene	  on	  the	  entire	  physical	  world,	  such	  that	  any	  change,	  no	  matter	  how	   insignificant,	   might	   be	   sufficient	   for	   an	   entirely	   different	   set	   of	   mental	   relata	   to	  supervene.	  If	  we	  are	  considering	  the	  possible	  causal	  efficacy	  of	  Alice’s	  intention	  to	  surprise	  Bob	  on	  the	  physical	  outcome	  of	  Bob’s	  startled	  jump,	  then	  it	  is	  extremely	  counterintuitive	  to	  commit	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  mental	  cause	  has	  changed	  because	  of	  a	  slight	  rearrangement	  of	  particles	   in	   a	   distant	   galaxy.	   Surely	   the	  mental	   relata	   supervene	   on	   a	   somewhat	   smaller	  batch	  of	   the	  physical	  world.	  Picking	  out	  what,	   exactly,	   goes	   into	   the	  patch	  of	   the	  physical	  world	   on	   which	   a	   particular	   candidate	   mental	   cause	   supervenes	   has	   proven	   to	   be	   a	  contentious	  issue.	  	  Strategy	   (iii)	   involves	   denying	   the	   intuition	   that	   there	   is	   autonomous	   mental	   causation.	  Reductive	  physicalism	  of	  any	   stripe	   is	   an	  example	  of	   this,	   of	  which	  Kim	  himself	   is	   a	  well-­‐known	   proponent.	   There	   are	   many	   versions	   of	   reductive	   physicalism,	   where	   the	   basic	  premise	   is	   that	   whatever	   the	   mental	   is,	   it	   reduces	   to	   or	   is	   nothing	   over	   and	   above	   the	  physical.	  Even	  stronger	  views,	  like	  eliminative	  physicalism	  (Churchland	  1981),	  advocate	  the	  eventual	  eschewal	  of	  all	  mental	  terminology.	  	  	  Strategy	   (iv)	   takes	  a	   somewhat	  different	   tack.	   Instead	  of	   simply	  denying	   the	   legitimacy	  of	  the	  intuition,	  some	  philosophers	  offer	  a	  replacement	  for	  genuine	  causal	  efficacy,	  something	  that	   explains	  why	   it	   seemed	   as	   if	   the	  mental	  were	   causally	   efficacious	  without	   having	   to	  grant	   full-­‐blown	   mental	   causation.	   Jackson	   and	   Pettit	   (1990),	   for	   instance,	   distinguish	  between	  causal	  efficacy	  and	  causal	  relevance.	  Causal	  efficacy	  is	  what	  actually	  causes	  things	  to	  happen;	  causal	  relevance	  is	  what	  properties	  have	  such	  that	  they	  are	  cited	  in	  good	  causal	  explanations.	  But,	  while	  causally	  relevant	  properties	  may	  be	  explanatory,	   they	   lack	  causal	  efficacy.	  For	  example,	  according	   to	   this	  view,	  being	   fragile	   is	   causally	   relevant	   to	   the	  vase	  breaking,	   even	   though	   it	   was	   not	   the	   fragility	   that	   was	   causally	   efficacious	   in	   the	   actual	  breaking.	  This	   applies	   to	   the	  debate	   regarding	  mental	   causation	  by	   characterizing	  mental	  properties	   as	   causally	   relevant,	   even	   while	   it	   is	   always	   some	   other,	   quite	   specific,	   set	   of	  physical	  properties	  that	  are	  causally	  efficacious.	  	  	  Strategy	   (v)	   is	   related	   to	   (i	   and	   ii)	   in	   that	   it	   focuses	   on	   the	   character	   of	   the	   relata	   and	  relationships	  in	  the	  diagram	  above,	  but	  instead	  of	  changing	  the	  kind	  of	  relationship	  between	  the	  mental	  and	   the	  physical,	   it	  argues	   that	   the	  vertical	   lines	   in	   the	  diagram	  don’t	  exist.	   In	  other	  words,	   it	   denies	   the	   identity	   of	   token	  mental	   and	   physical	   relata,	   and	   by	   doing	   so,	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prevents	  the	  causal	  exclusion	  problem	  from	  being	  formulated.	  If	  the	  token	  of	  a	  mental	  event	  is	  not	   identical	   to	  or	  does	  not	  supervene	  solely	  on	   the	   token	  of	  a	  physical	  event,	   then	   the	  very	  way	  in	  which	  the	  problem	  is	  framed	  is	  specious	  (Andersen	  2009).	  	  There	   is	   a	   delicate	   balance	   to	   be	   struck	   in	   such	   strategies	   for	   responding	   to	   the	   causal	  exclusion	  problem	  for	  mental	  causation.	  The	  relationship	  between	  the	  mental	  and	  physical	  is	  itself	  as	  much	  a	  live	  issue	  for	  discussion,	  and	  as	  unresolved,	  as	  the	  existence	  or	  nature	  of	  mental	  causation	   itself.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	   if	  we	  are	  willing	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  mental	  does	  have	  genuine	  causal	  efficacy,	  then	  we	  can	  use	  the	  causal	  exclusion	  problem	  as	  a	  rough	  guide	  towards	  how	  best	  to	  represent	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  mental	  and	  physical.	  It	  would	  serve	  as	  a	  constraint	  on	  our	  representations	  that	  they	  yield	  the	  correct	  answer	  with	  respect	  to	   mental	   causation,	   and	   this	   would	   rule	   out	   some	   construals,	   such	   as	   token-­‐identity	   of	  mental	   and	   physical	   events.	   It	   would	   not	   constrain	   enough	   to	   yield	   a	   single	   unequivocal	  solution,	   but	   it	   would	   be	   a	   substantive	   guide.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   though,	   we	   should	   be	  legitimately	  concerned	  about	  making	  this	  assumption	  about	  genuine	  mental	  causal	  efficacy,	  since	  we	  might	   take	   the	  causal	  exclusion	  problem	  to	  show	  exactly	   that	   this	  assumption	   is	  unwarranted.	  In	  that	  case,	   it	   is	  ad	  hoc	  to	  gerrymander	  our	  characterizations	  of	  the	  mental	  and	   the	  physical	   in	  order	   to	  reach	   the	  conclusion	   that	   the	  mental	   is	  genuinely	  efficacious.	  Rather	   than	   guiding	   us	   towards	   solving	   other	   problems	   like	   that	   of	   the	   mind-­‐body	  relationship,	  it	  begs	  precisely	  the	  question	  at	  issue.	  	  	  This	   leads	   to	   strategy	   (vi):	   focus	   on	   causation	   as	   a	   way	   to	   situate	  mental	   causation	   in	   a	  broader	  perspective	  with	  better	  evidential	  footing.	  This	  tactic	  allows	  us	  to	  pose	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not,	  and	  in	  what	  way,	  the	  mental	  has	  genuine	  causal	  efficacy	  without	  having	  to	  make	  assumptions	  about	  how	  to	  best	  represent	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  mental	  and	  physical	   relata	   in	   question.	  Accounts	   of	   causation	  provide	   independent	   evidential	   criteria	  for	   what	   it	   takes	   to	   count	   as	   a	   cause	   of	   something	   else;	   we	   can	   use	   these	   to	   investigate	  whether	  any	  mental	  ‘causes’	  actually	  meet	  the	  criteria	  for	  causation.	  	  One	   way	   in	   which	   this	   has	   been	   done	   is	   to	   challenge	   the	   treatment	   of	   the	   mental	   and	  physical	   relata	   as	   sufficiently	   distinct	   that	   we	   can	   even	   sensibly	   ask	   the	   question	   about	  which	  one	  does	  the	  causing	  (Dardis	  1993;	  Campbell	  2010;	  Andersen	  2009).	  Kim’s	  original	  question,	   of	   whether	   it	   is	   M1	   or	   P1	   that	   causes	   M2,	   is	   misleading	   in	   that	   it	   asks	   us	   to	  implicitly	  treat	  these	  as	  distinct	  causal	  relata.	  They	  simply	  aren’t	  in	  competition,	  such	  that	  one	  –	  the	  physical	  –	  ‘wins	  out’	  over	  the	  other.	  Arguing	  from	  causal	  exclusion	  to	  the	  inefficacy	  of	  the	  mental	  is,	  on	  this	  strategy,	  a	  kind	  of	  category	  mistake.	  	  	  Another	   way	   that	   strategy	   (vi)	   can	   be	   implemented	   to	   undermine	   the	   causal	   exclusion	  problem	   is	   to	   turn	   to	   contemporary	   accounts	   of	   causal	   explanation	   and	   see	   how	  mental	  causal	   relata	   fare	   on	   such	   accounts.	   Davidson’s	   assumption	   about	   causation	   requiring	  general	   laws	   is	   widely	   rejected,	   and	   the	   causal	   exclusion	   problem	   cannot	   be	   formulated	  within	  many	  contemporary	  accounts	  of	  causation.	   In	   the	   last	   several	  decades,	   remarkable	  progress	   has	   been	   made	   in	   developing	   sophisticated	   philosophical	   and	   mathematical	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techniques	  for	  analyzing	  causal	  structure.	  We	  can	  translate	  the	  question	  of	  mental	  causation	  into	   specific	   accounts	   of	   causation	   to	   see	   if	   there	   is	   anything	   genuinely	   causal	   about	   the	  mental	   in	   each	  account.	  Once	  we	  do	   this,	   it	   turns	  out	   that	  on	  almost	   every	   contemporary	  account	  of	  causation,	  the	  mental	  has	  as	  much	  causal	  efficacy	  as	  any	  other	  cause	  outside	  of	  fundamental	  physics.	  	  Consider	   an	   example	   of	   this.	   On	   the	   influential	   interventionist	   account	   of	   causation	  (Woodward	  2003),	   the	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	   the	  mental	  has	  causal	  efficacy	   is	  made	  more	   specific	   by	   considering	   a	   variety	   of	   causal	   variables	   that	   could	   represent	   different	  aspects	  of	  mental	  causation.	  One	  could	  ask	  about	  the	  role	  of	  conscious	  visual	  awareness	  in	  actions	  like	  reaching	  for	  and	  grasping	  objects.	  Each	  of	  these	  would	  be	  treated	  as	  a	  variable	  that	  takes	  on	  different	  values:	  perhaps	  Conscious	  visual	  experience	  (yes,	  no)	  and	  Reaching	  (hand	  pre-­‐formed,	  hand	  not	  pre-­‐formed).	  One	  would	  then	  consider	  the	  empirical	  research	  on	   this	   in	   order	   to	   determine	   if	   these	   two	   variables	  meet	   the	   criteria	   for	   having	   a	   causal	  relationship	   between	   them.	   Put	   very	   simply,	   this	   is	   a	   way	   of	   asking	   whether	   or	   not	  intervening	  on	  conscious	  visual	  awareness	  of	  an	  object	  changes	  the	  way	  in	  which	  we	  reach	  for	  those	  objects.	  Once	  we	  establish	  the	  answer	  (which,	   in	  this	  case,	   is	  yes	  –	  see	  Andersen	  2009,	  chapter	  3),	  we’ve	  shown	  that	   there	   is	  at	   least	  one	  case	  of	  mental	  causation,	  namely	  that	  which	  is	  represented	  by	  the	  variables	  in	  question.	  	  	  Against	  this	  kind	  of	  mathematically	  sophisticated	  and	  scientifically	  grounded	  account,	  Kim’s	  causal	  exclusion	  argument	  looks	  rather	  simplistic	  and	  naïve.	  One	  might	  want	  to	  protest	  that	  the	   variables	   are	   just	   a	   stand-­‐in	   for	   the	   real	   causal	   story,	   which	   surely	   involves	   just	   the	  neurophysiological	   processes	   initiated	   by	   light	   impinging	   on	   the	   retina,	   and	   so	   forth.	   To	  defend	   this	   response	   in	   the	   face	   of	   a	   well-­‐validated	   account	   of	   causation	   that	   has	  independent	   justification	  for	   its	  requirements	  on	  what	  counts	  as	  a	  cause,	  one	  should	  have	  more	  than	  just	  the	  intuition	  that	  the	  ‘real’	  causal	  story	  is	  elsewhere.	  This	  is	  a	  key	  advantage	  to	  treating	  the	  problem	  of	  mental	  causation	  as	  one	  of	  causation	  in	  general,	  rather	  than	  one	  of	  mental	  causes	  as	  sui	  generis:	  given	  such	  well-­‐established	  and	  explicitly	  justified	  methods	  for	   finding	   causal	   structure,	   it	   takes	   a	   great	   deal	   to	   show	   that	   the	   answer	   yielded	   by	  accounts	  of	  causation	  such	  as	  interventionism	  are	  incorrect.	  This	  puts	  the	  onus	  on	  reductive	  physicalists	  to	  show	  what	  is	  wrong	  in	  such	  analyses	  and	  to	  offer	  a	  more	  substantive	  defense	  of	  what	  counts	  as	  a	  ‘real’	  causal	  story,	  a	  very	  challenging	  task.	  	  	  These	   six	   different	   argumentative	   strategies	   cover	   a	   vast	   number	   of	   different	   accounts,	  organized	   in	   terms	   of	   commonalities	   they	   share	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   aspect	   of	   the	   causal	  exclusion	  problem	  that	  they	  address.	  While	  there	  are	  multiple	  aspects	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  mental	  causation,	   there	   is	  no	  doubt	   that	   this	  problem,	   reconciling	  genuine	  mental	   efficacy	  with	  a	  physicalist	   view	   of	   the	   world	   and	   an	   ambiguous	   relationship	   between	   the	   mental	   and	  physical,	  is	  one	  of	  the	  main	  debates	  in	  contemporary	  philosophy	  of	  mind.	  	  	  
	   14	  
Directions	  for	  future	  research	  on	  mental	  causation	  	  The	  causal	  exclusion	  problem	  is	   interesting	  for	  the	  way	  in	  which	  it	  captures	  so	  clearly	  the	  dilemma	  for	  genuine	  mental	  causation.	  The	  generalized	  exclusion	  problem	  raises	  issues	  for	  many	  different	  kinds	  of	  higher	  level	  causes,	   including	  the	  mental	  as	  well	  as	  a	  huge	  host	  of	  other	  potential	  causal	  relata	  from	  various	  sciences.	  However,	  the	  version	  of	  causal	  exclusion	  that	  applies	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  mental	  causation	  has,	  as	  we’ve	  seen,	  a	  unique	  twist	  that	  renders	  it	   particularly	   difficult	   to	   deal	  with.	   There	   is	   no	   clear	   answer	   to	   the	   question	   of	   how	   the	  levels	  in	  question	  are	  related	  to	  one	  another.	  	  	  It	   is	   often	   tempting	   to	   treat	  mental	   causes	   as	   simply	   stand-­‐ins	   for	   the	   ‘real’	   causal	   story,	  which	   must	   be	   purely	   physical	   and	   involve	   neurophysiological	   processes.	   After	   the	   last	  section,	   we	   should	   be	   cautious	   about	   this	   practice.	   Once	   we	   meet	   the	   evidential	  requirements	   for	   independently-­‐justified	   accounts	   of	   causation	   for	   the	   mental	   to	   have	  genuine	  causal	  efficacy,	  it	  is	  unnecessary	  to	  reject	  mental	  causation	  by	  claiming	  that	  ‘really’	  what	   we’ve	   just	   shown	   is	   somehow	   false	   or	   merely	   apparent.	   Furthermore,	   it	   is	   a	  substantive	   task	   to	   translate	  one	  potential	   relatum	   into	  another.	  Moving	   too	  quickly	   from	  the	  mental	   to	   the	   neurophysiological	   risks	   changing	   the	   subject,	  where	   the	   new	   physical	  process	  or	  event	  may	  be	  causally	  efficacious,	  but	  not	  efficacious	  of	  the	  same	  effect	  as	  was	  the	  original	  mental	  relatum.	  	  	  This	   is	   where	   much	   of	   the	   future	   work	   regarding	   mental	   causation	   may	   be	   directed:	  towards	   a	   careful	   and	  detailed	   elaboration	   of	   the	   variety	   of	  ways	   in	  which	  mental	   causal	  relata	  can	  be	  translated	  into	  a	  format	  such	  that	  accounts	  of	  causation,	  coupled	  with	  results	  from	   cognitive	   neuroscience	   and	   psychology,	   can	   yield	   specific	   answers.	   The	   causal	  exclusion	  problem	  pitches	  mental	  causation	  as	  an	  all	  or	  nothing	  problem:	  either	  it’s	  causal	  or	  it’s	  not.	  Moving	  away	  from	  this	  approach	  means	  moving	  towards	  a	  scientifically	  enriched	  process	  using	  well-­‐confirmed	  tools	  from	  studies	  of	  causation.	  The	  goal	  then	  becomes	  to	  suss	  out	  the	  structure	  of	  mental	  causation	  and	  how	  it	  is	  situated	  in	  larger	  structures	  of	  the	  body	  and	  the	  environment.	  	  	  	  Davidson	  was	  onto	  something	  when	  he	  said	  that	  mental	  causation,	  whatever	  it	  was,	  needed	  to	   be	   the	   same	   ordinary	   sort	   of	   causation	   that	   is	   studied	   in	   the	   sciences.	   It	   cannot	   be	  something	  different	  or	  new	  without	  thereby	  bringing	  in	  the	  sorts	  of	  mysterious	  powers	  that	  anyone	  with	  a	  commitment	  to	  physicalism	  of	  any	  stripe	  should	  want	  to	  avoid.	  He	  was	  wrong	  about	  what	   that	   kind	   of	   causation	   is	   –	   there	   is	   no	   need	   to	   assume	  unknowable	   universal	  laws	   governing	   physical	   redescriptions	   of	   mental	   causal	   relata.	   The	   way	   forward	   in	   this	  debate	  will	  be	  through	  foregrounding	  the	  issue	  of	  causation,	  making	  the	  question	  of	  mental	  causation	  more	  explicitly	  one	  of	  mental	  causation.	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